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2 PLEADING STANDARDS AND DETERRENCE
1. Introduction
Federal courts in the United States have recently expressed concern about the high
costs of litigation for defendants, particularly the costs of discovery.1 Because of the
“American rule,” which makes the parties responsible for their own litigation costs
(Rowe 1982), defendants may incur great costs in litigation even when they are not
liable.
In a recent antitrust case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544, 570 [2007]),
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this concern by increasing the pleading standard,
permitting a defendant to seek dismissal of a lawsuit before discovery if the plaintiff
fails to allege a “plausible” claim. The Court rejected prior case law which permitted
suits to proceed to discovery and trial if the facts alleged were “merely consistent
with” an entitlement to recovery. The Court emphasized that a “plausibility” stan-
dard is necessary because the implausibility of a claim should “be exposed at the
point of minimum expenditure to time and money by the parties and the court.”2 In
a later case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556 U.S. 662, 684 [2009]), the Court made clear that this
new pleading standard applies to all cases.
The Court’s concerns in Twombly and Iqbal have spurred voluminous legal schol-
arship (see Reinert 2012). However, the literature has focused almost exclusively on
their effects on lawsuits already filed in federal court (Engstrom 2013, Kaplow 2013).
In contrast, we examine the effects of the stronger pleading standards implemented
by Twombly and Iqbal on the defendant’s incentives to engage in unlawful conduct
in the first place.
A potential defendant’s decision to engage in conduct which may harm another
party depends on the likelihood that the defendant’s action causes harm, and the
probability an injured party sues, obtains discovery and proves the claim in court.
Twombly and Iqbal change the pleading standard and therefore change the likelihood
of obtaining discovery and proceeding to trial. In this way, the Supreme Court
ruling affects the incentives potential defendants have for taking potentially harmful
actions in the first place. The impact of pleading standards on deterrence has largely
been overlooked by the literature. Ours is one of only a few papers that focus on the
effect of the Supreme Court’s decision on deterrence.
We develop a game theoretic model of litigant behavior to study the effects of
stronger pleading standards on the primary behavior of potential defendants. Using
intuitive assumptions, our analysis considers how an increase in pleading standards
1Discovery is a phase of litigation that allows the parties to compel the disclosure of evidence
from each other and from third parties. It is costly because the parties incur the costs of providing
requested information to the other side. For example, a party is permitted to request documents
or other tangible things from another party (Fed. R. Civ. P. 34). Typically a request for documents
requires a party to incur extensive search costs (e.g., looking through file cabinets and warehouses,
searching through electronic databases), production costs (e.g., making paper copies of the docu-
ments, subjecting the copies to review by attorneys for redaction of privileged matters), and distribu-
tion costs (e.g., shipping the documents to the requesting party). Similar costs arise for depositions
(Fed. R. P. 30), which allow the parties to compel the oral testimony of witnesses under oath.
2Twombly at 557 and 558.
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affects deterrence, and how its effect on deterrence may influence litigation accuracy
and total litigation costs. Our paper is not intended as a thorough welfare analysis
or to determine the optimal pleading standard, which would require a broader con-
sideration of all potential costs and benefits of the procedure change.3 Rather, our
focus is on deterrence. Our model is simple, intended to maximize intuition about
how pleading standards influence incentives to engage in illegal activity, a cost of
raising the pleading standard which has largely been overlooked in the literature.
The analysis determines how a potential defendant’s incentives to engage in an
illegal activity depends on the pleading standard. The equilibrium probability with
which the defendant takes the illegal action influences the likelihood the plaintiff
wins a suit that makes it to trial. In equilibrium, the defendant takes the unlawful
action neither so infrequently that it would never be rational for the plaintiff to
sue, nor so frequently that the plaintiff and judge always expect that he is liable.
Rather, he plays a mixed strategy. The defendant takes the unlawful action just often
enough to leave the judge indifferent between trying or dismissing a case.4 The
probability that the judge dismisses a case increases as the pleading standard rises.
The defendant recognizes this, and in response to the higher pleading standard, he
chooses the unlawful action more often.5
When deterrence decreases, potential defendants engage in illegal activities more
often, and the total amount of litigation increases. In this way, increasing pleading
standards can increase total litigation costs. This result works against the standard
argument in favor of higher pleading standards, as put forth by the Supreme Court
and throughout the literature. The majority in Twombly, for example, emphasized
that “it is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level [of plausibil-
ity] that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases
with no reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant
evidence to support [the] claim." (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559-60). We show that raising
pleading standards does not necessarily reduce the expense of litigation. Through
its effect on deterrence, increasing pleading standards increase the total costs of lit-
igation, the exact thing that increasing the standard is intended to decrease. To
understand this, note that total litigation costs depend on both the number of in-
juries and the probability an injury claim proceeds to litigation. We show that with
stronger pleading standards, a potential defendant engages in the unlawful activity
more often, which results in the plaintiff experiencing harm more often, which can
3Kaplow (2012) provides such an analysis, which we discuss in the literature review.
4The reasoning behind the mixed strategy equilibrium in our model is similar to that regarding the
mixed strategy equilibria in Ordover (1978) and Baker and Malani (2014), among others. Our contri-
bution comes from considering how changes to pleading standards may affect equilibrium behavior
and outcomes such as total litigation costs. Implicit in these models is an assumption that decision
makers are Bayesians, updating their beliefs about potential liability as the rate of equilibrium illegal
activity changes. For a discussion of such assumptions, see Friedman and Wickelgren (2006) and
Baker and Malani (2014).
5A similar effect would be caused by anything that increased the standard a case is held to before
proceeding to discovery and trial (Kaplow 2013).
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lead to an increase in litigation. For similar reasons, judicial screening increases the
equilibrium probability that the potential defendant is liable, but does not change
the probability that a liable defendant compensates the plaintiff for her injury. This
increases the ex ante probability that a defendant harms and does not compensate a
plaintiff, decreasing outcome accuracy.
Our results stand in contrast with those from models that do not account for the
impact of pleading standards on deterrence, and demonstrate the importance of
considering deterrence in an analysis of higher pleading standards. If we took the
probability of defendant liability as fixed, then increasing higher pleading standards
unambiguously decreases litigation costs. Allowing potential defendants to ratio-
nally change their behavior in response to changes in pleading standards reverses
the results. When accounting for (negative) deterrence effects, increasing pleading
standards tends to increase unlawful activity, resulting in a net increase in litigation
costs and a net decrease in litigation accuracy.
One of the primary arguments in favor of increasing pleading standards is that
doing so will decrease the prevalence of nuisance suits filed by plaintiffs who sus-
tain no harm with the intent of attracting a settlement. To consider this possibility,
Section 6 extends our model to incorporate this feature, and determines under which
conditions nuisance suits arise in equilibrium. We show how increasing the plead-
ing standard in this environment continues to decrease deterrence and increase total
litigation costs. Thus, our main result from the earlier sections is shown to hold even
in the presence of nuisance suits. Increasing pleading standards increases incentives
of potential defendants to engage in illegal activity, even when it may decrease the
probability of nuisance suits in equilibrium.
An increased pleading standard may also be beneficial if it reduces the “chilling”
effects associated with potential defendants taking overly cautious actions from the
perspective of social welfare. To consider this possibility, Section 7 extends our
model to incorporate the chilling of desirable behavior, and identifies the conditions
under which the potential defendant takes an overly cautious action. We show
how increasing the pleading standard does not change the potential defendant’s
incentive to take the overly safe action. Thus, increasing pleading standards does
not necessarily have the benefit of reducing chilling effects. We also show how the
interaction between pleading standards and deterrence effects which we identify in
our main model continues to exist in this alternative model.
Therefore, our main results from the initial analysis continue to hold when we
incorporate nuisance suits and chilling effects into the analysis.
We formulate our argument using a stylized model, designed to most effectively
convey the intuition behind our results, and illustrate how higher pleading standards
decreases deterrence and can push up total litigation costs. Our intention is to isolate
the deterrence effect, rather than to derive social welfare or the optimal pleading
standard, and therefore it is appropriate to consider the simplest environment for
which our results exist. For example, we treat the process of discovery and trial
following a judge’s decision to permit a case as a black box, assuming only that it
imposes costs on litigants and determines a trial outcome. For the same reasons,
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we also abstract from summary judgment, which, like using pleading standards to
dismiss a lawsuit, is designed to reduce the costs of litigation. As we discuss in more
detail below, we consider summary judgment a part of the black box of litigation
because it typically cannot be used to avoid the costs of discovery, and thus does
not undermine the assumption used in the model that litigation is costly after the
pleading stage. Formally modeling such aspects of litigation would improve the
realism of the model, but would also greatly increase the complexity of the analysis
without adding to the basic intuition behind our argument. We discuss alternative
assumptions in Section 8.
The paper is presented as follows. Section 2 present literature review. Section
3 develops the game theoretic model. Section 4 solves for the equilibrium of the
game. Second 5 considers the impact of imposing strictly pleading standards. Sec-
tion 6 considers an extension of our framework, in which nuisance suits arise in
equilibrium. Section 7 considers an extension of the main model that incorporates
the chilling of desirable behavior. Section 8 discusses alternative assumptions and
Section 9 concludes. The appendix provides formal proofs of our results.
2. Literature Review
Twombly and Iqbal have generated a significant amount of scholarship, with at
least one scholar finding that, as of 2012, the decision has “been cited by more
than 26,000 courts, more than 500 law review articles, and innumerable briefs and
motions” (Reinert 2012). Some scholars have expressed support for the new pleading
standard (e.g. Anderson and Huffman 2010). Others, however, have argued that the
new pleading standards place a significant burden on plaintiffs asserting claims,
particularly civil rights claims, and that the standards effectively reduce access to
justice (e.g. Spencer 2013, Dodson 2013, Gelbach 2011, Steinman 2010, Miller 2010).
Still others argue that the new pleading standards are not new at all, since courts
have consistently required “plausibility” by only crediting “reasonable inferences”
(e.g Hartnett 2009, Huston 2010). And still others argue that the new pleadings
standards should be coupled with revised discovery procedures to avoid access to
justice problems (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2012, Dodson 2010).
The economic literature on the deterrence effect of law enforcement is also vast. In
his seminal work, Becker (1968) argues that since rational criminals respond to condi-
tions of risks, the probability and the severity of punishment deter crime. Since then,
scholars have focused on characterizing the optimal law enforcement system and
have extended Becker’s model to a variety of aspects of law enforcement.6 Friedman
and Wickelgren (2006) show how deterring all crime is not feasible unless judges
and juries have access to perfect information when assessing the liability of defen-
dants. Previous research also examines the effect of tort reforms on incentives to
obey the law and incentives for care. Png (1987) studies the effects of changes in
6Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2000) provide excellent surveys of the theory of optimal
law enforcement.
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court award, negligence standard and the allocation of litigation costs on potential
injurer’s incentive for care. Hylton (1990, 1993) and Wijck and Velthoven (2000) an-
alyze the influence of litigation cost allocation rules on deterrence. Polinsky and
Che (1991) examines the effect of reforms in the liability system on incentives for
care. Daughety and Reinganum (2013, 2014) studies how different liability regimes
affect the choice of care by firms when harm is cumulative. Jost (1995) examines
the effect of discovery rules on the incentives for accident prevention by potential
injurers. Landeo, Nikitin and Baker (2007) studies the effect of punitive damages
reforms, such as damage caps and split awards, on deterrence.
The mixed strategy nature of our equilibrium is not unique to our paper. For
example, Ordover (1978) argues that a plaintiff will follow a mixed strategy when
deciding whether to sue a defendant, as a defendant who is always sued will al-
ways have an incentive to avoid doing harm, and a defendant who is never sued
will always choose a harmful action. More recently, Baker and Malani (2014) show
that similar login carries over to the case of a judge deciding whether to dismiss a
case. They consider the relationship between the rate of dismissal and incentives
for deterrence. Absent from these analyses is a consideration of how changes to the
pleading standard as induced by Twombly and Iqbal alters the equilibrium outcome,
including total litigation costs.
Despite the significant scholarship on Twombly and Iqbal, only a few scholars ac-
knowledge the effect of these rulings on the defendant’s ex ante behavior. The most
closely related paper to ours is the concurrent work of Kaplow (2012), which presents
a general game theory model and considers termination of lawsuits at different
points during multistage adjudication. Kaplow, like us, allows dismissal standards
to influence incentives to take harmful actions in the first place. His impressive
analysis focuses on determining the characteristics of optimal dismissal procedures
in a general model; but given the generality of the framework, one cannot solve for
closed form solutions of equilibrium strategies, or say much about how changes to
dismissal standards influence equilibrium behavior away from the social optimum.
Our paper, on the other hand, presents a simple, highly-stylized model which fo-
cuses primarily on deterrence effects. We are able to derive closed-form solutions
for equilibrium strategies, and develop an understanding of how pleading standards
influence deterrence, even away from the socially optimal level. Being able to do this
is important for considering the impact of the recent Supreme Court rulings, as there
is no reason to believe that pleading standards are or were set at the optimal level.
Finally, by considering the simplest possible model in which pleading standards in-
fluence deterrence, we focus on developing intuition about the deterrence effects,
which have generally been overlooked in the literature.
In a law review article, Kaplow (2013) also discusses deterrence effects associ-
ated with pleading standards. Others who have pointed out the potential effect of
Twombly and Iqbal on deterrence have done so only briefly (Engstrom 2013, Hoffman
2011). Our analysis and Kaplow (2012) are the only articles that we are aware of to
analyze these effects within a formal model.
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Many scholars have empirically studied the effect of Twombly and Iqbal (e.g. En-
gstrom 2013, Gelbach 2011, 2012). However, they have only focused on the effect
of the decisions on dismissal rates. Of these scholars, Jonah Gelbach has acknowl-
edged the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on “primary behavior” (Gelbach 2012). But
Gelbach only provides some examples of the possible effects of judicial screening on
deterrence.7
3. Preliminaries
3.1. Model. We develop a stylized model simplified to highlight only the aspects
of the litigation process which are important for our argument. There are three
players: a plaintiff P who may experience harm, a defendant D who may be liable
for the harm, and a judge J.
The game takes place in four stages:
(1) D decides whether to take an unlawful action that benefits himself, but in-
creases the probability that P suffers a loss. If he takes the unlawful action,
he is “liable.” Whether P suffers a loss is publicly observable, but whether D
is liable is not. If P suffers a loss, regardless of whether D is liable, the game
moves on to stage 2. Let ` ∈ {0, 1} indicate that D takes the unlawful action.
(2) Observing the harm he experienced, P decides whether to sue D . Let s ∈
{0, 1} indicate that P sues D .
(3) J observes whether P suffered a loss, as well as the model parameters, and up-
dates his beliefs about the probability that D is liable. J then decides whether
to dismiss the case or proceed to trial. Let d ∈ {0, 1} indicate that J dismisses
the case. When d = 1, the game ends. When d = 0, the game proceeds to
stage 4.
(4) This is a non-strategic stage representing trial, including discovery and court-
room proceedings. We abstract from the details of the trial stage and for now
assume simply that trial perfectly reveals whether D is liable. A liable D must
compensate P for her full loss. A not liable D makes no payment to P . In ad-
dition to any compensation, trial imposes costs on D and P , which we denote
by cD > 0 and cP > 0.
We use ρ with an action-specific subscript to denote a mixed strategy. That is, ρ`
denotes the probability D chooses the unlawful action, ρs denotes the probability P
sues D , and ρd denotes the probability J dismisses a suit.
3.1.1. The Benefits and Harms of the Unlawful Act. We model D’s choice of whether
to take the liable action in stage 1 as a choice between two alternative actions, x1
and x0. Action x1 provides a higher direct benefit to D, but also imposes a negative
externality on P, for which D is “liable.” Without loss of generality, we assume action
x1 and x0 provides P benefit v1 = v > 0 and v0 = 0 respectively. So v represents
7The paper notes that a full-scale model of deterrence “is a daunting [task], and it is certainly
beyond the scope of [his] work” (p44).
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the reletive benefit from the unlawful action. One may imagine that x1 is an act of
negligence (e.g., not taking reasonable safety precautions), an act that is so inherently
dangerous (e.g., using dynamite) that the law makes the defendant strictly liable
for all losses caused by the act, or an intentional illegal act (e.g., entering into an
agreement to restrain trade). When D takes action x1, P experiences a loss of value
h > 0 with probability 1 due to D’s action. When D takes action x0, he is “not liable,”
although P may still experience loss h (e.g., one may still slip in a driveway even if
the owner takes all reasonable steps to minimize ice build up on the driveway; a
mine may still collapse even if the mining company used an explosive that is not
inherently dangerous under the law; or there may be restraints of trade that do not
violate antitrust law). Let η ∈ (0, 1) denote the probability that P experiences loss h
when D chooses x0; with probability 1− η no loss occurs.8 Any loss suffered by P is
publicly observed, although neither P nor J observe whether D is liable.
3.1.2. Trial and Discovery Process. If P brings suit against D, and the suit is not dis-
missed by J, the case moves to a trial stage in which it is publicly revealed whether
D is liable. The trial stage encompasses more than just the courtroom proceedings. It
also captures the discovery process that takes place following a judge’s decision not
to dismiss a case, in which the parties have an opportunity to compel the disclosure
of evidence from each other. We abstract from the details of the trial stage and for
now assume simply that when J does not dismiss a suit, ` is perfectly revealed be-
cause J has all of the relevant evidence before her.9 A suit that reaches the trial stage
imposes legal costs cP on P and cD on D, which encompass total costs of preparing
for and going to trial.
3.1.3. Litigant Payoffs. Both P and D are concerned about payments made from D to
P and about the cost of trial. The plaintiff and defendant earn respective payoffs
uP = −h + s(1− d)(`h− cP), and uD = v` − s(1− d)(`h + cD),
when P suffers loss h, and uP = 0 and uD = v0 when P does not suffer loss h.
Remember, t = 0 when the judge dismisses the case or a trial reveals that D is not
liable, and t = h when a trial reveals D is liable. The value s(1− d) equals 0 when P
does not sue D or the suit is dismissed, and 1 when the case reaches trial.
8Assuming that loss occurs with probability 1 when x1 simplifies the analysis, but does not drive
any of the results. Similar qualitative results would hold if we alternatively assumed harm probabil-
ities η1 and η0 corresponding to actions x1 and x0, where 0 < η0 < η1 < 1, meaning that loss is more
likely when D takes the unlawful action.
9We note that the trial stage may not, and usually cannot, perfectly reveal the liability of D because
the judge is limited to the relevant evidence provided by the parties. Nevertheless, we assume that
liability is “perfectly” revealed because the judge cannot consider anything more than this evidence
to determine liability. Indeed, it probably does not make sense to compare the evidence at trial to
perfect information because in most cases there is no way for either the parties or the judge to know
what “really” happened. In Section 8, we discuss in more detail how legal error affects our results.
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3.1.4. Judicial Screening. Given that P suffered loss h, P and J form their beliefs about
D’s first period action. Denote these beliefs by µ, where µ is the probability P and J
believe ` = 1 given that P suffered a loss. P forms these beliefs after harm occurs,
while J form these beliefs during the pleading procedure, when he is likely to be
made aware of the parameter values (for cD, cP, ν, h, η) which apply for the given
lawsuit.
J dismisses a case when she believes D is sufficiently unlikely to be liable. For-
mally, there exists a threshold value µ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that J dismisses a case when
µ < µ¯, allows the case to proceed to trial when µ¯ < µ, and can choose either action
or to to randomize when µ = µ¯.10 One interpretation of µ¯ is that the threshold at
which the social benefits of trial equal the costs. When µ is higher than this thresh-
old, D is sufficiently likely to be liable that a trial is warranted, and when µ is lower
than this threshold, the probability of trial leading to D being found liable is suf-
ficiently low that a trial is not worth the costs.11 We take a general approach to
interpreting these pleading standards, solving the game for any µ¯ ∈ (0, 1), and thus
allowing for any underlying objective function by J .
Because both Twombly and Iqbal increase the standard of plausibility that a lawsuit
must meet before proceeding to discovery and trial, the new pleading standard can
be reasonably interpreted as an increase in µ¯.
3.1.5. Solution Concept and Posterior Beliefs. We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) of the game. A description of equilibrium must define: (1) D’s choice
of ρ`; (2) P’s choice of ρs; and (4) J’s choice of ρd. Additionally, a formal description
of equilibrium should include P and J’s beliefs about `, given by µ. In equilibrium,
each player’s strategy must be a best response given the strategies of the other play-
ers and the player’s beliefs. Beliefs must be consistent with Bayes’ Rule given the
equilibrium strategies.
10It is conceivable that a pleading standard set by high court specifies that J take a specific action
when µ = µ¯. However, this does not appear to be the case when examining the language of the
Twombly and Iqbal rulings, which strongly suggest that the courts engage in a cost benefit analysis
when deciding whether to dismiss a lawsuit, necessarily giving J some discretion to dismiss (or
not dismiss) in very close cases. We therefore focus on pleading standards that do not specify a
tie breaking action; although considering such rules would be necessary if considering the optimal
design of pleading standards, which is not a focus of our paper.
11We can explicitly write down the judge’s payoff function and endogenize µ¯. For example, we can
write J’s utility as uJ = −(1− s(1− d))`θh− s(1− d)(cP + cD), where θh > 0 represents the social
costs due to the inaccurate litigation outcomes, and cP+ cD represents the deadweight loss associated
with discovery and trial costs. Dismissing a suit (so that s(1− d) = 0) avoids the costs associated with
trial, but also decreases the expected accuracy of the outcome. In this case, J receives expected payoff
uJ = −µθh, where µ is J’s posterior belief that D is liable. Conducting a trial maximizes the accuracy
of litigation outcomes, but incurs litigation costs. Therefore, J expects payoff uJ = −(cP + cD) from
allowing a case to proceed. When µ > (cP + cD)/θh, D is sufficiently likely to be liable and the
expected social benefits of trial dominate the costs. In this case, J prefers to allow a case to proceed
to trial. When µ < (cP + cD)/θh, however, the expected social benefits of trial are dominated by the
costs and J prefers to dismiss the suit. In the example above, µ¯ = (cP + cD)/θh.
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It is a requirement of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that equilibrium beliefs are
consistent with player strategies in earlier stages of the game. In equilibrium, the
posterior beliefs that P and J form about D’s first period action must be consistent
with D’s strategy ρ`. The equilibrium posterior belief represented by the probability
D is liable is therefore
µ = Pr(` = 1|h) = ρ`
ρ` + η(1− ρ`) .
3.2. Parameter Assumptions. In order to focus the analysis on the most relevant
parameter cases, we introduce two assumptions regarding D’s benefit from unlawful
action relative to lawful action, v, and P’s loss from unlawful action, h.
First, we assume that D’s benefit from unlawful action relative to lawful action is
not too large:
v < h + (1− η)cD. (A1)
When this assumption is violated, taking the unlawful action is sufficiently attractive
so that D always takes the unlawful action. We assume A1 to focus on litigation in
which judicial screening may impact D’s decision to take the unlawful action.
Second, we assume that the benefit to P of going to trial against a liable defendant
(h− cP) is positive:
h > cP. (A2)
When this assumption is violated, P would never sue D . We assume A2 to focus on
litigation in which J may play an active role.
4. Equilibrium
We divide the possible equilibria into three categories. First, we consider the “full
deterrence” possibility in which D always chooses action x0. Second, we consider
the “no deterrence” possibility in which D always chooses the unlawful action x1.
Third, we consider the “partial deterrence” possibility in which D mixes between
action x1 and x0.
4.1. Full Deterrence Equilibrium. We can rule out the existence of a full deterrence
equilibrium in which D always takes the lawful action, x0.
In a full deterrence equilibrium, D always takes the lawful action, x0. J’s equilib-
rium belief about D’s liability must be consistent with D’s action. In a full deterrence
equilibrium, J’s posterior belief is µ = Pr(` = 1|h) = 0. This is lower than µ¯, so J al-
ways dismisses a lawsuit. Given J’s equilibrium strategy, D anticipates payoff v0 = 0
from the lawful action. When D deviates to take the unlawful action, he expects
payoff v1 = v > 0. Therefore, D has an incentive to deviate to take the unlawful
action and a full deterrence equilibrium does not exist.
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4.2. No Deterrence Equilibrium. We can also rule out the existence of a no deter-
rence equilibrium in which D always takes the unlawful action, x1.
In a no deterrence equilibrium, D always takes the unlawful action, x1. P and J’s
equilibrium beliefs about D’s liability must be consistent with D’s action, so their
beliefs are µ = Pr(` = 1|h) = 1 in a no deterrence equilibrium. This is higher than
µ¯, so J always allows a lawsuit to proceed.
Given J’s equilibrium strategy, P anticipates benefits h − cP from bringing suit
against D. A2 ensures h− cP > 0, so P prefers to sue D in a no deterrence equilibrium.
Given P and J’s equilibrium strategy, D anticipates payoff v1 − h − cD from the
unlawful action. When D deviates to take the lawful action, he expects payoff v0 −
ηcD. In a no deterrence equilibrium, D must prefer to take the unlawful action rather
than the lawful action. This is the case when v1− h− cD > v0− ηcD, or equivalently
v > h + (1− η)cD. Since this contradicts A1, a no deterrence equilibrium does not
exist.
4.3. Partial Deterrence Equilibrium. Next, we consider the possibility of a partial
deterrence equilibrium, where D chooses the unlawful action only some of the time.
There are two possible partial deterrence equilibria, depending on the value of µ¯.






When pleading standards are sufficiently low, J always allows lawsuits to proceed
to trial. In equilibrium, D mixes in his choice of the unlawful action, taking the
unlawful action just often enough to leave to leave P indifferent between pursuing
trial and not suing. Lemma 1 provides a formal summary of this partial deterrence
equilibrium.
Lemma 1. When (1) is satisfied, there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in which
• D’s strategy: choose the unlawful action with probability
ρ` =
ηcP
h− (1− η)cP .
• P’s strategy: bring suit against D with probability
ρs =
v
h + (1− η)cD
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A different partial deterrence equilibrium exists when the pleading standards are




In this case, J dismisses a lawsuit only some of the time. The equilibrium involves
D mixing in his choice to take the unlawful action, taking the unlawful action often
enough to leave P always suing D, and J indifferent between dismissing a case and
allowing a case to proceed to trial. J then dismisses a case just often enough to make
D indifferent in his choice of whether to take the unlawful action. Lemma 2 provides
a formal summary of this partial deterrence equilibrium.
Lemma 2. When (2) is satisfied, there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in which
• D’s strategy: choose the unlawful action with probability
ρ` =
ηµ¯
1− (1− η)µ¯ .
• P’s strategy: always sues
ρs = 1.
• J’s strategy: dismiss a case with probability
ρd = 1− vh + (1− η)cD .
• Posterior beliefs:
µ = µ¯.
When µ¯ = cP/h, there is a continuum of partial deterrence equilibria, which differ
in terms of P’s strategy to sue and J’s strategy to dismiss a case, but not in D’s
strategy to take the unlawful action which is the same in each of the equilibria. One
of these equilibria is identical to the partial deterrence equilibrium that is described
in Lemma 2. When discussing the impact of stronger pleading standards, we focus
on this equilibrium. Assuming that a different equilibrium arrises in the case where
a continuum of equilibria exists does not change our results.
5. Impact of Stronger Pleading Standards
The main contribution of our analysis is to study the impact of stronger pleading
standards on litigation outcomes and behavior, while accounting for the fact that
changes in litigation procedure will alter the incentives for potential defendants to
engage in unlawful behavior in the first place. Since stronger pleading standards
can be interpreted as an increase in µ¯ in our model, we consider the impact of an
increase in µ¯ on deterrence, litigation costs and litigation accuracy in this section.
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5.1. Deterrence. In this section, we consider the impact of increased pleading stan-
dards on D’s ex ante decision between the unlawful action x1 and the lawful action
x0.
From Lemma 1, when µ¯ < cP/h, there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in
which D chooses the unlawful action with probability
ρ` =
ηcP
h− (1− η)cP .
This probability does not depend on µ¯. So an increase in µ¯ has no impact on deter-
rence.
From Lemma 2, when µ¯ ≥ cP/h, there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in
which D chooses the unlawful action with probability
ρ` =
ηµ¯
1− (1− η)µ¯ .
By inspection, this probability is increasing in µ¯. So a marginal increase in µ¯ in-
creases the probability that D takes the unlawful action, decreasing deterrence.
Notice that when µ¯ = cP/h, the two equilibrium values of ρ` are equal. This
implies that the level of deterrence is a continuous function of µ¯, at first constant
and then decreasing in the pleading standard.
When pleading standards are sufficiently low (when µ¯ < cP/h), J always brings
suit to trial. In this case, a marginal increase in pleading standards has no im-
pact on behavior or deterrence. When pleading standards are relatively high (when
µ¯ ≥ cP/h), J dismisses a lawsuit with positive probability, and this probability de-
pends on the strength of the pleading standards. In this case, a marginal increase
in pleading standards results in higher probability that a lawsuit is dismissed by J.
D anticipates higher dismissal rates associated with higher pleading standards, and
chooses the unlawful action more often.
Therefore, when pleading standards are sufficiently low (when µ¯ < cP/h), a mar-
ginal increase in pleading standards has no impact on deterrence. When pleading
standards are relatively high (when µ¯ ≥ cP/h), a marginal increase in pleading stan-
dards decreases deterrence. Together, these results imply the following.
Proposition 1. Suppose the pleading standard increases from µ¯ to µ¯′ ∈ (µ¯, 1). If µ¯′ ≤ cP/h,
then the increase in pleading standard has no impact on deterrence. If µ¯′ > cP/h, then the
increase in pleading standard decreases deterrence.
5.2. Litigation Costs. Now we consider how stronger pleading standards affect total
litigation costs. A suit that reaches the trial stage imposes legal costs on both P and
D. The expected total litigation costs depend on the probability that P experiences
harm and the probability that a suit reaches the trial stage. Denote total litigation
costs by c.
Ec = [ρ`ρs(1− ρd) + (1− ρ`)ηρs(1− ρd)](cP + cD).
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(h+(1−η)cD)(h−(1−η)cP) if µ¯ < cP/h
ηv(cP+cD)
(h+(1−η)cD)(1−(1−η)µ¯) if µ¯ ≥ cP/h
As shown in Lemma 1, when pleading standards are sufficiently low (when µ¯ <
cP/h), J always allows a lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. In this case, D’s
decision to take the unlawful action and P’s decision to sue do not depend on µ¯. A
marginal increase in µ¯ has no impact on the probability that P experiences harm or
the probability that a suit reaches the trial stage, and therefore does not affect the
expected litigation costs.
When pleading standards are relatively high (when µ¯ ≥ cP/h), D’s decision to take
the unlawful action depends on the strength of the pleading standards. A marginal
increase in µ¯ incentivizes D to take the unlawful action more often, and therefore
increases the probability that P experiences harm. But the probability that a claim
reaches trial is independent of the pleading standard. Therefore, stronger pleading
standards increase the probability that P experiences harm and a suit reaches the
trial stage, resulting in higher expected litigation costs.
Therefore, when pleading standards are sufficiently low (when µ¯ < cP/h), a mar-
ginal increase in pleading standards has no impact on total litigation costs. When
pleading standards are relatively high (when µ¯ ≥ cP/h), a marginal increase in
pleading standards increases total litigation costs. Together, these results imply the
following.
Proposition 2. Suppose the pleading standard increases from µ¯ to µ¯′ ∈ (µ¯, 1). If µ¯′ ≤
cP/h, then the increase in pleading standard has no impact on expected litigation costs. If
µ¯′ > cP/h, then the increase in pleading standard increases total expected litigation costs.
In contrast to the Supreme Court’s statement that higher pleading standards de-
crease the costs of litigation, we find that the society may spend more on litigation
with higher pleading standards. This is because judicial screening causes the num-
ber of injury claims to increase, and does not alter the probability a given injury
claim reaches trial.
5.3. Outcome Accuracy. Now we consider how increased pleading standards affect
the expected value of δ ≡ |`h − t|, which represents the compensation error that
occurs when a liable D does not fully compensate P for her loss.
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(h+(1−η)cD)(h−(1−η)cP) if µ¯ < cP/h
ηµ¯h((h+(1−η)cD)−v)
(h+(1−η)cD)(1−(1−η)µ¯) if µ¯ ≥ cP/h
As shown in Lemma 1, when pleading standards are sufficiently low (when µ¯ <
cP/h), J always allows a lawsuit to proceed to discovery and trial. In this case, D’s
decision to take the unlawful action and P’s decision to sue do not depend on µ¯. A
marginal increase in µ¯ has no impact on the probability that P experiences harm or
the probability that a liable D compensates P’s loss, and therefore does not affect the
expected compensation error.
When pleading standards are relatively high (when µ¯ ≥ cP/h), a marginal increase
in µ¯ incentivizes D to take the unlawful action more often, but has no impact on
the probability that a liable D compensates P’s loss. Therefore, stronger pleading
standards increase the probability that D is liable and does not compensate P’s loss.
This increases the expected compensation error and reduces outcome accuracy.
Therefore, when pleading standards are sufficiently low (when µ¯ < cP/h), a mar-
ginal increase in pleading standards has no impact on outcome accuracy. When
pleading standards are relatively high (when µ¯ ≥ cP/h), a marginal increase in
pleading standards decreases outcome accuracy. Together, these results imply the
following.
Proposition 3. Suppose the pleading standard increases from µ¯ to µ¯′ ∈ (µ¯, 1). If µ¯′ ≤ cP/h,
then the increase in pleading standard has no impact on expected outcome accuracy. If
µ¯′ > cP/h, then the increase in pleading standard decreases expected outcome accuracy.
5.4. Eliminating Pleading. The analysis is primarily concerned with studying the
impact that an increase in the pleading standards has on outcomes. Given we find
that increasing pleading standards has detrimental effects, simultaneously increas-
ing both illegal activity and litigation costs, it is worth discussing the possibility of
eliminating pleading and the judge’s ability to dismiss cases prior to discovery.
The elimination of pleading is equivalent to setting µ¯ = 0 in our framework.
Just as an increase in pleading standards is never beneficial in our framework, the
elimination of pleading is never harmful. It will either improve outcomes or have no
impact on behavior.
In a world without pleading, a case is certain to go to trial if the plaintiff sues.
This increases the incentives that a potential defendant has to avoid harming the
plaintiff. In this case, illegal activity and the costs of litigation are lower than when
judges hold cases to high standards of plausibility before allowing them to proceed
to discovery and trial.
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6. Extension with Nuisance Suits
One of the primary arguments in favor of increased pleading standards is that
they will decrease the prevalence of “in terrorem” or nuisance lawsuits. These are
frivolous lawsuits intended to entice settlement from a likely innocent defendant
who wants to avoid litigation costs.
Nuisance suits do not arise in equilibrium of our initial model. One might imagine
that such suits do not arise because we abstract from settlements, ignoring the pos-
sibility that litigants might choose to settle a case prior to trial. Even if we allowed
pre-trial settlements in our model, however, nuisance suits would not arise. This is
due to the underlying assumption that the plaintiff in the initial model can only sue
when she suffers a loss. When the plaintiff sustains harm and files a lawsuit against
a defendant, the suit cannot be considered frivolous. To get nuisance suits as part
of an equilibrium, the model needs to allow the plaintiff to sue a defendant despite
not sustaining any harm.
In this section, we consider an alternative model which incorporates this element.
We keep the initial model from Section 3 unchanged except for the assumption that
the plaintiff can sue even when she sustains no harm. We define a nuisance suit as
any lawsuit filed by a plaintiff who sustains no harm.
Consider the subgame after the plaintiff suffers no harm. In this case, the plaintiff
receives zero payoff if she does not sue. If the plaintiff sues, the judge observes that
the defendant sustains no harm and believes that the defendant is not liable (i.e.
µ = 0). In this case, the judge will dismiss the suit and the plaintiff will receive
payoff zero. So the plaintiff is indifferent between suing and not suing when she
sustains no harm. Suppose that in equilibrium the plaintiff sues with probability
ρˆs ∈ (0, 1) when she sustains no harm. In equilibrium, both the plaintiff and the
defendant expects zero payoff when the plaintiff experiences no harm.
After solving the subgame after the plaintiff suffers no harm, we can derive a
new reduced game by replacing this subgame with the payoffs that result from this
subgame. In the new reduced game, the game ends when the plaintiff experiences
no harm, where both the plaintiff and the defendant receives zero payoff. This
game is exactly the same as the game in Section 3, which has been solved in Section
4. Combining the results from Section 4 with the subgame equilibrium after the
plaintiff suffers no harm, we have the following results.
Lemma 3. When µ¯ < cPh , there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in which
• D’s strategy: choose the unlawful action with probability ρ` = ηcPh−(1−η)cP .• P’s strategy: bring suit against D with probability ρˆs when sustaining no harm, and
bring suit against D with probability ρs = vh+(1−η)cD when sustaining harm.• J’s strategy: always dismiss the suit ρd = 0 when P sustains no harm, and never
dismiss the suit ρd = 0 when P sustains harm.
• Posterior beliefs: µ = cPh .
When µ¯ ≥ cPh , there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in which
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• D’s strategy: choose the unlawful action with probability ρ` = ηµ¯1−(1−η)µ¯ .
• P’s strategy: bring suit against D with probability ρˆs when sustaining no harm, and
always sue ρs = 1 when sustaining harm.
• J’s strategy: always dismiss the suit ρd = 0 when P sustains no harm, and dismiss a
case with probability ρd = 1− vh+(1−η)cD when P sustains harm.• Posterior beliefs: µ = µ¯.
A nuisance suit arises when the plaintiff sues despite not sustaining any harm.
In equilibrium, this occurs with probability pnuisance = (1 − ρ`)(1 − η)ρˆs, where
(1− ρ`)(1− η) represents the probability that the defendant takes the lawful action
and no harm occurs.




h−(1−η)cP if µ¯ < cP/h
(1−µ¯)(1−η)ρˆs
1−(1−η)µ¯ if µ¯ ≥ cP/h
As shown above, when µ¯ < cP/h, the probability of a nuisance suit does not
depend on µ¯. A marginal increase in µ¯ thus has no impact on the probability that
a nuisance suit arises in equilibrium. When µ¯ ≥ cP/h, D’s decision to take the
unlawful action depends on the strength of the pleading standards. A marginal
increase in µ¯ incentivizes D to take the unlawful action more often, and therefore
increases the probability that P experiences harm. When P experiences harm and
files suit against a defendant, the suit cannot be considered frivolous. Therefore,
stronger pleading standards decreases the probability that a nuisance suit arises in
equilibrium. This captures the intuition for the Supreme Court’s argument that high
litigation costs are leading to nuisance suits, and that increasing pleading standards
can decreases the prevalence of such suits.
However, our results show that deterring nuisance suits is not the only effect of an
increase in pleading standards. As µ¯ increases, equilibrium ρ` also increases when
µ¯ ≥ cP/h. Therefore, even in the model where nuisance suits exists, increasing the
pleading standard decreases deterrence. We can also verify that total litigation costs
is increasing µ¯ when µ¯ ≥ cP/h. This is because judicial screening causes the number
of injury claims to increase, and does not alter the probability a given injury claim
reaches trial.
Proposition 4. Suppose the pleading standard increases from µ¯ to µ¯′ ∈ (µ¯, 1) in the model
with nuisance suits. If µ¯′ ≤ cP/h, then the increase in pleading standard has no impact
on deterrence, total litigation costs or nuisance suits. If µ¯′ > cP/h, then the increase in
pleading standard decreases deterrence, increases total litigation costs and reduces nuisance
suits.
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Given the deterrence effects of increasing pleading standards, our results suggest
that alternative procedural mechanisms that decrease nuisance suits without de-
creasing deterrence may dominate an increase in the pleading standard. Alternative
possibilities include committing the parties to liability determinations by the judge,
such as barring settlement between the parties prior to trial, or mandating motions
for summary judgment (Rosenberg and Shavell 2006, Kozel and Rosenberg 2004).
The analysis in this section illustrates how increasing pleading standards can si-
multaneously decrease the prevalence of nuisance suits and increase illegal activity.
Considering the tradeoff between these positive and negative effects is beyond the
scope of the current paper. Doing so requires a more detailed consideration of the
real world distribution of the parameters at the heart of the model, which may allow
one to further compare the trade off between the benefits and costs. At a minimum,
the current analysis highlight how increasing pleading standards cannot be done at
zero costs, and that there are deterrence effects which should be taken into account
to assessing judicial procedure.
7. Extension with “Chilling” Effects
The previous model focuses on a setting in which deterring defendants from a
potentially harmful activity is optimal. Absent from the analysis is any notion of a
“chilling” effect, where the threat of lawsuits leads a potential defendant to take an
overly safe action from the perspective of social welfare. For example, a company
may not choose efficient, procompetitive behavior for fear of being sued (promo-
tional product pricing may look like predation), and a physician who worries about
false positives may deny treating high-risk patients (Kaplow 2011). In such an alter-
native setting, judicial screening may be beneficial if it encourages more risky (but
socially optimal) behavior. In such situations, the pleading standard effectively be-
comes the new liability rule (see Easterbrook 1989). This is another potential benefit
of judicial screening that is absent from our main model, which could help offset the
negative effects of increased pleading standards.
In this section, we consider an extension with “chilling” effects. In particular, we
consider an alternative model with an initial stage in which D decides whether to
choose an overly safe action, xs. This action does not result in harm for the plaintiff,
and provides the defendant immunity from being sued. For example, a company
cannot be sued for anti-competitive behavior if it does not enter the market, and
a physician cannot be sued for malpractice if he refuses to treat patients. When D
chooses the overly safe action xs in the first stage, the game ends and D receives
payoff vs, which is less than v0, D’s payoff from choosing the lawful action x0.12
When D forgoes action xs, the game proceeds to the game described in Section 3.1,
in which D chooses between the lawful action, x0, and the unlawful action, x1. The
12Since we assume v0 = 0 in the main model, vs < v0 implies that vs < 0. The assumption
that v0 = 0 simplifies the exposition of the paper, but is not necessary for our results. As long as
vs < v0 < v1, the qualitative results hold.
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plaintiff can perfectly observe whether the defendant chooses the overly safe action
xs, but he doesn’t know whether the defendant takes action x0 or x1 in stage two.
This is consistent with the fact that it is easy to observe whether a company enters
the market or a doctor treats a patient, but it is fairly difficult to observe whether a
company engages in anti-competitive behavior or a doctor takes enough care when
treating patients.13
In the subgame after the defendant forgoes action xs, there are two subgame equi-
libria, depending on the strength of the pleading standard (see Lemma 1 and Lemma
2). In the Appendix, we show that in both equilibria, the defendant expects payoff
− ηvcD
h + (1− η)cD .
In the first stage of the game, the defendant chooses the overly safe action xs when
his payoff from action xs is higher than his expected payoff from forgoing action xs.
This is the case when
ηvcD
h + (1− η)cD < vs. (3)
As shown in (3), the range of parameter values such that D prefers to chill is
independent of µ¯. This implies that increasing pleading standards do not change
the defendant’s expected payoff from taking action x0 or x1, and therefore does not
change his incentive to take the overly safe action.
As the pleading standard becomes stronger, the defendant chooses the illegal ac-
tion more often in his mixed strategy. This would be beneficial for D if the the like-
lihood that a liable D compensates P did not change as well. However, with higher
pleading standard, P experiences harm more often, and the probability that a claim
reaches trial is independent of the pleading standard. Therefore, stronger pleading
standards increase the probability that P experiences harm and a suit reaches the
trial stage, making it more likely for a liable D to compensate P. This increased costs
from a higher probability of being forced to compensate P exactly offsets the in-
creased benefit of engaging in the illegal activity more often (i.e. of facing a stronger
pleading standard). Equilibrium payoffs to D, as a result of these offsetting effects,
do not change with the pleading standard. As a result, the incentives for chilling
also remain constant in the pleading standard.
When (3) is not satisfied, the defendant prefers to forgo the overly safe action in
the first stage. In this case, the new model has the same equilibrium outcomes as
in the main model, and an increase in pleading standards tends to increase illegal
activity, and total expected litigation costs.
Proposition 5. In the model with “chilling” effects, increasing pleading standards
• has no impact on the range of parameter values for which D prefers to choose the
overly safe action;
13Assuming that the overly safe action is unobservable does not change the qualitative results. As
long as the overly safe action removes the probability of harm, then whenever harm occurs (the only
interesting case in the game without nuisance suits), the plaintiff knows that the defendant didn’t
take the overly safe action.
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• tends to increase illegal activity and expected litigation costs when (3) is not satisfied,
and otherwise has no impact on illegal activity, or expected litigation costs.
8. Alternative Assumptions
In the previous sections, we extend the model to allow for settlement, nuisance
suits, and “chilling” effects. In this section, we discuss other simplifying assump-
tions that we made in the model, and whether relaxing them is likely to affect our
results.
8.1. Imperfect trial outcomes. In the above analysis, we consider an environment in
which trials perfectly reveal defendant liability. This means that a defendant, aware
of his own liability, can perfectly predict trial outcomes. This assumption greatly
simplifies the analysis and exposition of the paper. Relaxing this assumption does
not change the qualitative results.
In unreported analysis, we solve the game assuming that trials result in the wrong
outcome with positive probability. The effect of increased pleading standards on
deterrence, litigation costs and litigation accuracy does not change as long as wrong
outcomes do not happen too often.
8.2. Summary judgements. We also abstract from summary judgment procedures,
which permit a party to avoid trial if she “shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the [she] is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). Summary judgment procedures, like pleading standards,
are used by courts so that “factually insufficient claims or defenses c[an] be isolated
and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of
public and private resources.” (See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)
(discussing both motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment)).
Abstracting away from summary judgment does not materially affect our analy-
sis. Motions for summary judgment, unlike the motions to dismiss at the pleading
stage, cannot be based on the allegations in pleading alone. Instead, a party seeking
summary judgment show that the evidence would not allow the other side to prevail
at trial. As a result, motions for summary judgment can only be asserted after both
sides have had sufficient discovery to support their claims and defenses. (See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(d)).
Moreover, the “plausibility” standard articulated by the Court in Twombly was
primarily derived from the summary judgment standard of “plausibility” used in
antitrust cases. See (Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)). Accordingly, any lawsuit that survives
dismissal under the plausibility standard articulated in Twombly would very likely
also survive a summary judgment motion (Thomas 2010). The only way a motion
for summary judgment would be granted is if additional discovery was conducted
and a party unearthed new evidence which would support the motion. In other
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words, the effective use of summary judgment to get rid of a nondismissed case
would necessarily entail some costly discovery.
Because motions for summary judgment only reduce costs, and do not eliminate
them, we abstract from them because they do not undermine the assumption in the
analysis that the trial and discovery process imposes costs on both parties.
9. Conclusion
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (550 U.S. 544 [2007]) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (556
U.S. 662, 684 [2009]), the U.S. Supreme Court increased the standard of plausibility
that lawsuits must meet before being allowed by a judge to proceed to discovery
and trial. The Court has concluded that stronger pleading standards are necessary
to reduce the number of unnecessary lawsuits, decrease total costs of litigation, and
improve outcome accuracy. Although these claims are true in a setting in which
the unlawful behavior of defendants is taken as given, our analysis shows how the
conclusions may be reversed when potential defendants can adjust their unlawful
behavior in response to changes in the litigation environment. When we account for
deterrence effects, stronger pleading standards lead to the dismissal of weaker cases
which would otherwise proceed to trial, which in turn incentivizes potential defen-
dants to take unlawful actions more often. In this way, stronger pleading standards
decrease deterrence, increasing the amount of unlawful activity. This can lead to
the simultaneous increase in total litigation costs and decrease in outcome accuracy.
With deterrence effects, our model finds that increased pleading standards tend to
have the opposite effects as argued by the Supreme Court.
Our results do not rule out the possibility that stronger pleading standards pro-
vides benefits in some situations. In Section 6, we show that stronger pleading
standards may decrease the prevalence of pure nuisance suits where plaintiffs sue
despite of not sustaining harm. In that setting, we show how stronger pleading stan-
dards simultaneously decrease the prevalence of nuisance suits, and increases illegal
activity and total litigation costs. Because of this, our contribution should be seen as
highlighting a previously unrecognized cost of increasing pleading standards, which
exists along side the previously recognized benefits. Our results emphasize the im-
portance of accounting for deterrence effects when considering changes to judicial
procedure.
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Appendix A. Mathematical Appendix
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1. In this section, we consider a partial deterrence equilibrium
in which J never dismisses a lawsuit. We first show that in such a partial deterrence
equilibrium, P must play mixed strategies.
Suppose that P always sues D after he experiences harm. In this case, D expects
payoff v1 − h− cD = v− h− cD from the unlawful action, and expects payoff v0 −
ηcD = −ηcD from the lawful action. A1 implies that v− h− cD < −ηcD, so D prefers
to always take the lawful action. This contradicts that D plays mixed strategies in a
partial deterrence equilibrium.
Suppose that P never sues D . In this case, D expects payoff v1 = v > 0 from the
unlawful action, and expects payoff v0 = 0 from the lawful action. Since v1 > v0,
D prefers to always take the unlawful action. This contradicts that D plays mixed
strategies in a partial deterrence equilibrium.
We have ruled out the possibility that P plays mixed strategies in a partial deter-
rence equilibrium. Now let’s suppose that D takes the unlawful action with proba-
bility ρ`, and P sues D with probability ρs. After experiencing harm h, P is indifferent
between suing and not suing when
ρ`
ρ` + η(1− ρ`)h− cP − h = −h.
The left hand side of the above equation represents P’s expected payoff from suing,
while the right hand side of the above equation equals his expected payoff from not
suing. Solving this equation, we have D’s equilibrium strategy
ρ` =
ηcP
h− (1− η)cP .
A2 ensures ρ` is between 0 and 1.
D expects payoff v1 − ρs(h + cD) = v− ρs(h + cD) from the unlawful action, and
anticipates payoff v0 − ηρscD = −ηρscD from the lawful action. In a partial deter-
rence equilibrium, D is indifferent between the unlawful action and the lawful action.
This is the case when
v− ρs(h + cD) = −ηρscD.
Solving this equation, we have P’s equilibrium strategy
ρs =
v
h + (1− η)cD .
A1 ensures ρs is between 0 and 1.
It remains to show that J prefers to always bring a case to trial. Given D’s equilib-
rium strategy ρ`, P and J’s posterior belief is
µ =
ρ`
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J prefers to bring a lawsuit to trial when she believes D is very likely to be liable.





When this condition is satisfied, there exists a partial deterrence equilibrium in
which J always brings a case to trial, and D and P play the strategies specified
above.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2. In this section, we consider a partial deterrence equilibrium
in which J dismisses a lawsuit with probability ρd. Suppose that in equilibrium D
takes the unlawful action with probability ρ`. Given D’s equilibrium strategy ρ`, P
and J’s posterior beliefs are
µ =
ρ`
ρ` + η(1− ρ`) .
J is indifferent between trying and dismissing a case when µ = µ¯, or equivalently
ρ`
ρ` + (1− ρ`)η = µ¯.
Solving for ρ`, we have D’s equilibrium strategy
ρ` =
ηµ¯
1− (1− η)µ¯ .
Given D’s equilibrium strategy, P’s expected benefit from suing D is
µ¯h− cP.
When µ¯h− cP < 0 or equivalently µ¯ < cP/h, P prefers not to sue D . Given P’s
strategy, D anticipates payoff v1 = v > 0 from the unlawful action, and anticipates
payoff v0 = 0 from the lawful action. Therefore, D prefers to always take the un-
lawful action. This contradicts that D mixes between action x1 and x0 in a partial
deterrence equilibrium. So we don’t have a partial deterrence equilibrium when
µ¯ < cP/h.
When µ¯h − cP > 0 or equivalently µ¯ > cP/h, P prefers to sue D . Given P and
J’s strategy, D expects payoff v1 − (1 − ρd)(h + cD) = v − (1 − ρd)(h + cD) from
the unlawful action, and anticipates payoff v0 − η(1− ρd)cD = −η(1− ρd)cD from
the lawful action. In a partial deterrence equilibrium, D is indifferent between the
unlawful action and the lawful action. This is the case when
v− (1− ρd)(h + cD) = −η(1− ρd)cD.
Solving this equation, we have J’s equilibrium strategy
ρd = 1− vh + (1− η)cD .
A1 ensures that ρd is between 0 and 1. Therefore, when µ¯ > cP/h, we have a
partial deterrence equilibrium in which D takes the unlawful action with probability
ρ` =
ηµ¯
1−(1−η)µ¯ , P sues with probability 1, and J dismisses a case with probability
ρd = 1− vh+(1−η)cD .
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When µ¯h− cP = 0 or equivalently µ¯ = cP/h, P is indifferent between suing and
not suing D . Suppose P sues D with probability ρs. Given P and J’s strategy, D
expects payoff v1 − ρs(1− ρd)(h + cD) = v− ρs(1− ρd)(h + cD) from the unlawful
action, and anticipates payoff v0 − ηρs(1− ρd)cD = −ηρs(1− ρd)cD from the lawful
action. In a partial deterrence equilibrium, D is indifferent between the unlawful
action and the lawful action. This is the case when
v− ρs(1− ρd)(h + cD) = −ηρs(1− ρd)cD.
Solving this equation, we have
ρs(1− ρd) = vh + (1− η)cD .
A1 ensures that ρs(1− ρd) is between 0 and 1. Therefore, when µ¯ = cP/h, we have a
continuum of partial deterrence equilibria in which D takes the unlawful action with
probability ρ` =
ηµ¯
1−(1−η)µ¯ , P sues with probability ρs, and J dismisses a case with
probability ρd. In this equilibrium, ρs and ρd must satisfy ρs(1− ρd) = vh+(1−η)cD .
A.3. Extension with “Chilling” Effects. In the subgame after the defendant forgoes
action xs, there are two subgame equilibria, depending on the strength of the plead-
ing standard (see Lemma 1 and Lemma 2). Now we derive the defendant’s expected
payoff in both equilibria.
From Lemma 1, we know that when (1) is satisfied, there exists a partial deterrence
equilibrium in which D chooses the unlawful action with probability ρ` =
ηcP
h−(1−η)cP ,
P brings suit against D with probability ρs = vh+(1−η)cD , and J never dismisses the
suit (ρd = 0). In this case, D’s expected payoff
EuD = ρ`(v− ρs(h + cD)− (1− ρ`)ηρscD
= − ηvcD
h + (1− η)cD .
From Lemma 2, we know that when (2) is satisfied, there exists another partial
deterrence equilibrium in which D chooses the unlawful action with probability ρ` =
ηµ¯
1−(1−η)µ¯ , P brings suit against D with probability ρs = 1, and J dismisses a case with
probability ρd = 1− vh+(1−η)cD . In this case, D’s expected payoff
EuD = ρ`(v− (1− ρd)(h + cD)− (1− ρ`)η(1− ρd)cD
= − ηvcD
h + (1− η)cD .
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